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Muslim Public Self-Presentation:
Interrogating the Liberal Public Sphere
I n this article I want to address a number ofissues thrust into the open by different mani-
festations of Islamist politics and the intersec-
tion of religion and identity politics in Western
societies. This intersection should be read in
conjunction with the emergence in Muslim-
majority societies of forms of political activism
that ground themselves in Islamic doctrines and
invoke religious traditions as frames of refer-
ence. It is necessary in reading the contentions
surrounding Muslim identity politics in Western
settings that we take into account factors shap-
ing the dynamics of interaction between West-
ern countries and Muslim societies, not least
among which are the long-standing historical
relations associated with the colonial experi-
ence and its aftermath.
In this paper I argue that the contentions
surrounding Muslim public self-presentation in
Western public spheres arise in conjunction
with the historical traditions of discipline and
normalization in relation to which Muslims are
proving to be recalcitrant subjects. Further, the
projections of Muslim
subjectivities in liberal
public discourses are
underpinned by assump-
tions about subject pop-
ulations rooted in
colonial discourses and
practices. The liberal project of government in
colonial settings rested on assumptions about
the colonized, in particular relating to matters
of sexuality, gender, and morality. Contempo-
rary Muslim interrogations of the liberal public
sphere face off with forms of government and
discipline that hark back to the relations be-
tween the colonizer and the colonized. On one
hand, the dominant groups in Western societies
tap into historical constructions of the Other,
while Muslim minorities, among others, in the
West are informed by the legacies of
colonialism.
In its earlier phases Islamist politics in
Muslim-majority societies was anchored within
the boundaries of the nation-state and, as such,
its implications for non-Muslim societies, in
particular Western ones, appeared to be of sec-
ondary nature.1 The situation changed when
certain kinds of Islamist activism shifted locale
and targets and moved to the West. At this
point, the challenge of what came to be termed
radical Islam became a major preoccupation of
public opinion and policy-makers alike. I want
to suggest that the concern with the challenge
of militant Islamism, while in some respects
justified, is often collapsed with another sepa-
rate, but related challenge posed by certain
forms of politics that Muslims engage in. Of
these forms I want to focus on Muslim public
self-presentation in the liberal public sphere
and the questions that this puts to liberal norms
and values. But before I do that, I will make
two digressions. First, I will overview some
assumptions about the liberal public sphere.
Second, I will highlight how these assumptions
have been negotiated by Muslim-majority soci-
eties historically and in the present. Following
that, I will turn to the terms in which Muslim
public self-presentation in secular Western soci-
eties interrogates the liberal public sphere.
Muslims and the Secular
Imperative of the Liberal
Public Sphere
The debates about “Islam in Europe” and the
place of Muslims in European societies are to a
great extent organized against the background
of assumptions about the liberal public sphere
as an essential component of the Western demo-
cratic polity. Readings and assessments of Mus-
lim public self-presentation and the signs of
Islam in the public space are framed by the as-
sumptions of the secular liberal public sphere.
These readings and assessments are presented
as expressions of an achieved consensus on the
nature of the public sphere and public space and
as an affirmation of highly valorized norms and
values. However, the terms through which Mus-
lim practices of public self-presentation are
problematized in such assessments, as Nilüfer
Göle ~2002, 178! points out, inform us of the
“unspoken, implicit borders and the stigmatiz-
ing exclusionary power structure of the secular
public sphere.”
In principle and according to conventional
understandings—formalized by Habermas—the
public sphere is an arena of deliberation and
debate involving rational subjects. The underly-
ing premise is that of neutrality and equality:
neutrality towards identity and equality of all
subjects. In some sense, subjects of the public
sphere are presumed to be non-marked, equal,
and universal. But as critics of this formulation
point out, this neutrality is questionable ~see
Benhabib 1992; Fraser 1992; Warner 1992!.
The taken-for-granted public subject is not neu-
tral, but male, white, middle class, and secular.
Further, it is pointed out that the idea that in
the public sphere impartial reason stands above
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and against differentiated moral subjects serves to sanction par-
ticular subjects and invalidate others. In other words, the norma-
tivity of the secular public sphere is accomplished by exclusion,
stigmatization and repulsion of subjectivities falling outside its
confines.
As argued by a number of scholars, the public sphere is not
just an arena of deliberation, but also a space of identity forma-
tion through performances of subjectivities and visual displays
as well as through validation and authorization ~see Warner
1992; Çinar 2005!. As such, an examination of the contentions
surrounding certain forms of identity-formation and self-
presentation in the public sphere helps inform us of the inclu-
sionary and exclusionary practices at work. As noted above, in
the secular public sphere the dynamics of identity and difference
play out in relation to the presumed neutral and unmarked sub-
jectivities, the ones taken for granted and validated. Others who
differ are stigmatized, marked, and potentially excluded.
The contemporary contentions surrounding Muslim public
self-presentation in Western settings should be read in light of
the historical entanglements of the colonial encounter, in partic-
ular, in relation to discourses and practices of power at the heart
of colonial governmentality. Colonial regimes of discipline were
instrumental in redrawing the boundaries of the public and pri-
vate in colonized societies ~Cooper 1992!. At the same time,
elites in the colonized countries acceded to the conditions of the
secular public sphere in order to renegotiate their authority and
leadership roles within the project of modernity ~Gasper 2001!.
In this regard, the secularization of the public sphere was ac-
cepted as an imperative of civilization and progress by Muslim
intellectuals and leaders in many Muslim-majority societies fol-
lowing their encounter with Western modernity. Historically for
Muslims in Muslim-majority societies negotiating modernity
was shaped by this secular imperative. The project of modern-
ization integrated secularization of the public sphere, taking the
form of banishing signs of religion from the public domain, ef-
fecting state control over religion, and instituting secular reason.
Further, the objects of change and reform identified in the
project of modernization were shaped by the sensibilities articu-
lated in Western accounts and critiques of local traditions and
practices.2 For example, the idea of the liberation of Muslim
women through education and unveiling emerged as a necessary
condition of modernization that most often was modeled after
the Western experience. Muslim intellectuals subscribed to the
view propagated in colonial discourses about the condition of
Muslim women as a reflection of the backwardness of Muslim
societies ~see Ahmed 1992!.
If we consider the development of the secular public sphere
in Turkey, Iran, and Egypt we find that the banishment of cer-
tain signs and markers, like the veil, was enacted as a form of a
secularizing and modernizing rite of passage.3 As Göle argues,
women in Turkey became a “sign0site” in the construction and
projection of the public sphere ~Göle 2002, 184!. In the same
vein, forced unveiling in Iran in the first half of the twentieth
century, as pointed out by Minoo Moallem ~2005, 69!, consti-
tuted “a corporeal inscription of modern citizenship.” Following
a similar logic, the taking off of the veil by Huda Sha’rawi
~Egypt’s pioneer leader of the women’s movement in the early-
twentieth century! upon her return from Europe, was one of
those performative acts marking Egypt’s passage or entry into
the space and time of modernity.4 Imbued with the meanings
invested through secular practices, the veil appeared as the sign
of backwardness, a regression in the civilizing process with its
associated styles of dress. The social imaginary that articulates
these views and projects them into the public gaze, then, neces-
sitates banishment and exclusion.5 Through a particular histori-
cal construction, the unveiled woman was an affirmation of the
modern self. By extension, the absence of signs of Islamicity
was construed as evidence of a modernizing society, indeed of a
civilizing one.
The Liberal Public Sphere: Disciplining
Muslim Subjectivities
The reassertion of religion in the public sphere puts into
question the integration of secularism into the project of moder-
nity in both Muslim-majority societies and in Western societies.
In the former, Islamist movements have agitated for forms of
politics anchored in certain constructions of religion as captured
in the idea of the Islamic state and Islamic government. Here,
there may appear to be an instrumentalization of religion for
political ends. Along with the declared political agenda of
Islamist movements, there has also been a project of Islamiza-
tion that is not political in the narrow sense ~i.e., it is not about
state and government!, but political in the broad sense as it re-
lates to relations of power in society, rearranging gender rela-
tions, family norms, and modes of conduct in public and
interaction.
This broad Islamization agenda brings back a politics of visi-
bilization of markers of the Islamic identity. Being Muslim
is asserted through dress, modes of conduct in public, self-
education in religion, and disciplining and representing oneself
according to proffered modes of the ideal or good Muslim. This
has a wide set of political implications with different slants ac-
cording to the context in which Islamization takes place. In
Muslim-majority societies, Islamization drives manifested them-
selves with reference to the safeguarding of religious orthodoxy
by governing public morality. Much activism in this domain has
focused on the governance of gender relations, and the regula-
tion of cultural products and intellectual expressions in terms of
the rules of the licit and illicit ~however constructed!. So, we
have had the famous episodes of seeking to ban books, films,
billboards, and the like. Alongside this activism, there is a
growing adoption of religious attributes and self-fashioning after
the image of the ideal Muslim, again proffered by diverse au-
thorities to different effects.
Various accounts explaining the assertion of religiosity in
public are given by the subjects involved, by scholars and by
agents of the state. These accounts are sometimes overlapping
and often competing and contradictory. On one hand, we have
subjects who claim that their self-presentation is a matter of
their faith and is not about politics. This account is given in
both Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority societies. We also
have scholars who wish to privilege this account on the merit
that it is validated within existing religious traditions. In con-
trast, policy-makers and some scholars have located this agency
in the sphere of contestation politics and claim-making that in
secular society is problematized as expressing a break away
from the norms of the secular public sphere. And we have here
the concerns about integration and good citizenship. In this re-
spect, a wide range of public policies project Muslim subjectivi-
ties that are stigmatized and seen to be in need of reform and
remake. Certain practices of Muslim public self-presentation
and norms of interaction are problematized in public policy de-
bates and regulations. The questions of women adopting the veil
and Muslim attitudes about sexual mores have emerged as key
subjects of discussion and as targets of normalization.
Illustrative of the divergent ways of framing the question of
Muslim public self-presentation are the numerous episodes of
hijab management in France, the UK, and other European coun-
tries. As argued by Talal Asad ~2006!, what emerges in such
episodes reveals more about the subjectivities that the states in
question wish to allow and nurture and those that they do not
wish to sanction. What transpires with the visibilization of the
signs of Islamicity is the assertion of corporeal, gendered, and
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spatial practices of self that are read not only as distinct from
the dominant practices of secular society, but as contrary, offen-
sive, and threatening to the ones necessitated for the perfor-
mance of the secular subject—the one who, as in the French
case, appears as the subject worthy of valorization and protec-
tion as the Stasi Commission on Laïcité assured ~Le Monde
2003!.
The performances of the Muslim self through the adoption of
the veil is interpreted as a manifestation of backwardness, patri-
archal domination, false consciousness, and arrested intellectual
development ~the Stasi Commission on Laïcité!. The Commis-
sion affirmed that in the educational setting, the headscarf as a
sign that has a visible religious character is perceived by many
as contrary to the educational mission of providing a neutral
space for critical consciousness to grow. However, far from
being neutral, the terms of this intervention assert the preroga-
tives of the French state in forming subjects through the secular
educational system ~Asad 2006, 217–9!. In this system, the
norms promoted are posited as emancipatory in contrast to the
presumed oppression associated with hijab-wearing ~Stasi Com-
mission on Laïcité!, a practice interpreted as reflecting male
dominance and female subservience.
State intervention, backed up by an apparent public consen-
sus, appeals to the principles of the higher good of women, as-
serting that the goal is to save them from oppression. The
underlying assumption here is that some individuals, in this
case, Muslim immigrant women, are incapable of free autono-
mous action and hence cannot be depended upon to govern
themselves in accordance with liberal norms. This assumption
as argued by Hindess ~2001! lies at the heart of liberalism as a
project of government and justifies interventionist governmental
measures aimed at reform of these lesser subjects. The framing
of the issue in terms of oppressed Muslim women in need of
emancipation is not without grounding in colonial discourses
and policies ~Abu Lughod 2002!. Guénif-Souilamas shows the
terms of the contemporary reconfiguration of earlier paternalis-
tic colonial policies towards women. In this reconfiguration of
colonial discourses and practices, the Arab boy and the beurette
emerge as two organizing figures in debates on citizenship and
society ~Guénif-Souilamas 2002, 2003!. The former is a figure
of menace, while the latter is the successful subject of the
state’s normalizing and civilizing policies.
Images of the Other in colonial discourses and techniques of
discipline that were developed in colonial practices are re-
deployed in the new context. The effect has been the displacing
of the conditions that structure subject positions and compelling
certain subjectivities while stigmatizing and denying others.
Thus, the image of the violent Arab youth who is oversexed and
out of control recalls the figure found in colonial narratives of
the deviant Arab whose mores were explained by an aberrant
religion tolerant of transgressive sexuality. Such constructions
do not consider that the macho Arab youth may be a particular
refiguring of a declining working class culture formed in the
image of the dominant society by those immigrant workers
ghettoized in the suburbs ~Guénif-Souilamas 2002!. This
refiguring that may take the form of machismo on the part of
the children of immigrant workers pushed into greater marginal-
ization finds its grounding in a hypersexuality previously valo-
rized in the adopted countries ~Guénif-Souilamas 2002!. Rather,
the stigmatization of particular subjectivities articulates with an
essentialization of Arabs and Muslims, confining their identities
to fixed traits and attributes from which they cannot escape.
The association of Muslim identities with violence and with
the negation of Republican citizenship compels the formation of
new subjects seeking recognition in the public sphere. As ar-
gued by Ruth Mas ~2006!, the “secular Muslim” as the subject
of action in recent contestations in France is a compelled sub-
ject.6 The secular Muslim is formed in opposition to the identi-
fication of “Muslim” as a violent and non-integrated Other,
asserting the possibility of identifying as both Muslim and secu-
lar citizen of the Republic. This can only be achieved by mark-
ing difference with the conventional classification of Muslim as
believing and practicing.7 At the same time, the link between
the current techniques of government and the violence of the
colonial practices is acknowledged in the assertion of the com-
pelled subjectivities. The marchers and petitioners of “secular
Islam” express their rejection of the new reserves of the ban-
lieues ~Mas 2006!. The petition submitted in connection with a
demonstration, named Marche des indigènes underscored the
continuity of colonial practices and activities in the state’s treat-
ment of populations from the former and present colonies ~Mas
2006, 600!.
The dynamics of direct and indirect colonial rule are at work
in the management of Muslim immigrants in contemporary
Western societies. In an extension of the politics of “customary
law” that were an important element of “indirect rule,” the gov-
erning of “post colonial” subjects requires the establishment of
local authorities and the incorporation of customary laws with
the proviso that they do not contradict the repugnancy laws, i.e.,
the laws that define the outer limits of the civilized order.8 It is
these laws that new immigration directives and regulations em-
body. They signal to Muslims that their customary rules are per-
missible within the confines of norms of liberal government. In
a reissue of the repugnancy laws, Western immigration minis-
tries and directorates concerned with the management of cul-
tural diversity put out a list of non-permissible acts—self-
evident repugnant acts—that are normally associated with
Muslims, namely divorce by repudiation and female circumci-
sion. However, as the list expands, the civilized order faces its
limitations, or perhaps must expose its authoritarian face.
In addition to the strategies of indirect rule being redeployed
in the governing of immigrant populations, the detailed policies
of reform and improvement devised in direct rule have their
resonance in the disciplining policies aimed at Muslim subjects.
As pointed out by Mamdani ~1996!, the system of indigénat,
devised by the French colonial administration in Algeria, put
into effect rules governing the quotidian and the mundane, pun-
ishing minor non-conformities with the civilized order. Indeed,
the objective of reforming the recalcitrant subjects by teaching
them to respect authority was paramount ~Mamdani 1996, 126!.
Under direct rule, natives were required to conform to European
laws and only the civilized among them were to gain European
rights ~Mamdani 1996, 16!, while others were excluded. In
order to be admitted and recognized in the public sphere, the
natives had to conform to the rules of this order. To this end,
colonial government concerned itself with the self-presentation
of colonial subjects. In his revealing essay on the management
of the natives’ attire by the British colonial administration in
India, Bernard Cohn ~1992! shows the disciplining dimensions
of the regulations on the wearing of shoes, turbans, caps, and
other items of clothing. The regulations of clothing and the
strategies of representation that they involved were part of the
production of the civilized subject. In a similar manner, the
French colonial rulers conceived of unveiling women as one of
the civilizing accomplishments of colonial government. Thus
conformity in public self-presentation to the rules and images
put out by the colonial government was essential to gaining
entry into civilized society and its public sphere. This is cap-
tured in Cecil Rhodes’s assertion that “citizenship would be a
privilege of the civilized” and that “equal rights @are# for all
civilised men” ~quoted in Mamdani 1996, 165!.
With a view to disciplining the potentially recalcitrant Mus-
lim subjects, immigration policies in a good number of Euro-
pean countries aim to ensure the admission of reformed and
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normalized Muslims. Towards this end, prospective Muslim ap-
plicants are examined and assessed on their attitudes on issues
of sexual mores and gender interaction, and on their tolerance
towards difference. These practices of governance aimed at
Muslims embody techniques of normalization while also reveal-
ing the assumptions underlying the constructions of Muslims as
radically different and, most likely, culturally alien. In these
constructions, religion appears as the defining element of iden-
tity, relegating other factors such as gender, class, and social
background to a secondary place in the constitution of Muslim
subjectivities. As such the tests and examinations to which they
are subjected are intended to determine the degree of their open-
ness and acceptance of liberal norms and, by extension, the ex-
tent to which they are able to shed their religious attachments.
The successful subject of these examinations and tests must be
able to demonstrate certain sensibilities on gender issues and
sexual mores.9
Negative sensibilities in response to Muslims have conjured
up in Western imaginaries certain types of Muslims who repre-
sent a particular threat that must be dealt with. A recent incident
that took place in Quebec, anecdotal as it may be, illustrates
how much there is a felt need to regulate and manage Muslim
public presence and practices. In January 2007, the town council
of Hérouxville, a small town in a rural region of Quebec, issued
a code of behavior for prospective immigrant-residents outlining
“how we do things here.” The gist of it is that gender mixing
and unrestricted dietary provisions are the norm; covering the
hair, stoning, and burning women alive are not and will not be
allowed. Hérouxville’s code appears as an anomaly; the town
has a single immigrant family, and it is undoubtedly known by
all that stoning and burning alive are prohibited by the Canadian
criminal code. So, there does not seem to be a reason for
Hérouxville’s action. But what Hérouxville undertook is not
much different from earlier Quebec government attempts to de-
vise codes governing the expressions of Muslim subjectivities.
In the early 1990s, the Quebec Ministry of Cultural Communi-
ties and Immigration issued a guiding document to prospective
immigrants that was distributed through immigration offices and
indicated practices illegal in Quebec. These included female
circumcision and divorce by repudiation.
Beyond the question of the role of religion in public lies the
challenge of society as an ongoing project or an unfinished
business. While Hérouxille was signaling the fixity of its values,
and later on the Quebec Premier, when he waded in on the en-
suing debates, insisted that some things were not negotiable, the
reality of immigration and diversity reopens old debates and
demands negotiation.10
The paradox for liberal secular society and liberal political
rule is that though convinced by the superiority of its values and
norms and the attendant subjectivities it authorizes, it must also
attend to the exigencies of an image of self that does not ac-
knowledge the dynamics of power at play, in particular the ex-
clusionary practices that are ultimately maintained by the
privileging of secular subjectivities. Again, as Talal Asad points
out the Commission on Laïcité was more about reaffirming the
secular character of the French Republic than about tolerance
and inclusion. Asad correctly argues that the Commission
delved into the motives and emotions of the scarf-wearers in
order to determine their suitability for the secular personality of
the Republic. In other words, this was ultimately an exercise in
sovereignty through the state’s assertion of its control of signs
in the public sphere and of its powers of forming and disciplin-
ing subjects.
Concluding Remarks
I want to end by suggesting that the apparent inconsistencies
of liberalism are built-in inconsistencies that result from a mode
of government that relies on individuals to govern themselves in
a particular way that is consistent with the norms of secular
subjectivities. When individuals and groups fail to govern them-
selves in the terms prescribed, then liberal modes of governance
shift gear to illiberal practices in order to discipline the recalci-
trant subjects, beckoning them to discipline themselves accord-
ing to the dominant norms of liberal rule. Judged by secular
liberal norms during the colonial period, colonized populations
were not at the right stage of self-governance, and as such,
democratic principles of rule could not be applied in governing
them. It was then thought that these populations had yet to take
the same steps taken by Western society on the civilization lad-
der, and until they did, they were to be governed through au-
thoritarian styles of rule. Today, the recalcitrant subjectivities
performed by immigrants ~in this case Muslims! are within lib-
eral societies and the desire0need to regulate them has required
the expression of a degree of intolerance as in the banning of
the veil, or the a priori insistence that some things are
non-negotiable.
Notes
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the conference, Diver-
sity and National Identity in the European Union: Multicultural Challenges,
at the Instituto Portuges de Relaçoes Internacionais, University Nova de
Lisboa. Lisbon, March 22–23, 2007, Lisbon. This revised version benefited
from presentations by Nacira Guénif-Souilamas and Schirin Amir-Moazami
at the workshop, Conceptions of Islam, University of Bergen, August 27–31
2007, Bergen.
1. We should also recall that Islamist political forces were treated by
Western power, in particular the U.S., as instruments of combat against
other adversaries, mainly the Soviet Union at the global level and Arab na-
tionalism at the regional level.
2. The Western gaze on practices of child-rearing, policies on poverty,
the position of women in society, and much else informed diverse projects
of reform spearheaded by indigenous elites. On Egyptian reform projects in
the area of poverty for example see Ener 2003, on Indian elites’ critiques of
traditional practices in marriage see Panikkar 1995.
3. The discussion in this paragraph draws on Ismail 2007.
4. Later in the twentieth century, forced veiling in Iran punctuated an-
other moment of state intervention in the perpetuation of particular forms of
femininity ~Moallem 2005, 70!. In contrast, in Turkey and Egypt, the propa-
gation of veiling and the various modalities of its adoption serve to remap
old and new subjectivities in the public sphere.
5. Such was the case with the Turkish Parliamentarian who, in 1999,
was run out of Parliament before she could give her oath of allegiance be-
cause she wore a veil on the day of her swearing-in ceremony ~Göle 2002!.
6. Mas delineated a number of groups and activities as constituting
secular Islam in France. The groups include the Mouvement des musulmans
laïques de France, while activities centered in petitions such as the l’appel
de mai and Le Manifeste des libertés-Être de culture musulmane et contre
la misogyny, and l’appel des indigènes.
7. A similar positioning is assumed in the formulation of the move-
ment “ni pute ni soumise” ~neither whore nor submissive!. For a critical
reading of this positioning see Guénif-Souilamas 2003.
8. I am drawing here on Mamdani’s articulation of the notions of di-
rect and indirect rule and his insightful analysis of the integration of cus-
tomary law into systems of indirect rule. New forms of indirect rule in the
contemporary context include efforts by Western states to identify and in
many instances to create institutions of “native” rule. In this vein, the
French state assiduously went about cultivating local leaders and encourag-
ing the formation of a national organization representative of Muslims.
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These efforts culminated in the creation of the Council of Muslims in
France. See Fernando 2005.
9. In Germany, in what came to be known as the “Muslim test” admin-
istered by the state of Baden-Württemberg, Muslim applicants for German
citizenship are quizzed on their views on homosexual relations, claims about
the role of Jews in the world, and girls taking part in school sports activi-
ties. One question inquires into whether the applicant would approve of his0
her son having a homosexual relationship. In the Netherlands, prospective
immigrants are shown a video-film entitled To the Netherlands intended to
expose them to the host culture, with scenes of a topless woman sunbathing
and of two men kissing in a meadow.
10. In response to the debates on cultural accommodation and the con-
troversy caused by the Hérouxville affair, the Quebec Premier established
the Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cul-
tural Differences, and appointed communitarian thinker Charles Taylor and
historian Gérard Bouchard as co-chairs.
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